Bangladesh’s votes and India’s woes

2026-01-29 - 21:21

SINCE the fall of Sheikh Hasina’s regime, New Delhi has faced growing policy anxiety as Bangladesh approaches new elections. The political landscape in Dhaka, once largely aligned with India, has shifted beyond New Delhi’s control. Approximately two months before the polls, India is confronting a scenario for which it is ill-prepared. The emerging environment reflects widespread anti-Indian sentiment, stemming from India’s close association with the Hasina Government. Initially rising on popular support, the Awami League gradually resorted to oppressive measures to retain power. India built strong ties with Hasina’s Government while largely ignoring public opinion. This approach yielded security, trade and connectivity benefits, but came at the cost of repression, electoral manipulation and curtailed political freedom. The abrupt and violent fall of Hasina weakened India’s political capital in Dhaka. Granting asylum to the ousted Prime Minister further strained relations, while the assassination of student leader Sharif Osman Hadi triggered anti-India protests. Even sports were politicized: the expulsion of a Bangladeshi IPL player under pressure from Hindu extremist groups led Dhaka to refuse sending its cricket team to India for the upcoming T20 World Cup. For New Delhi, these developments are deeply unsettling. Dhaka has sought closer ties with Pakistan and China, asserting political autonomy and rejecting strategic dependence on India. Anti-India rhetoric has gained traction among youth and urban voters, who view India as a dominant neighbour prioritizing authority over accountability. Political forces emerging from the uprising have capitalized on this sentiment. The National Citizens’ Party (NCP) presents itself as the heir to the student movement, openly criticizing Indian policies and gaining rapid electoral visibility. India’s concern is amplified as the NCP forms alliances, most notably with Jamaat-e-Islami (JI), merging youth-driven protest legitimacy with organizational depth. Meanwhile, the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) has aligned with religious parties like the Jamiat-e-Ulema-e-Islam (JUI). With the Awami League out of contention, anti-India sentiment has become electorally structured, transforming diffuse public anger into coordinated political opposition. The victory of Jamaat-aligned candidates in last year’s Dhaka University elections underscored this shift, signalling that anti-India narratives resonate even in elite, traditionally secular spaces. India’s response has been cautious, relying on selective diplomacy and indirect engagement to shape outcomes while marginalizing provisional leaders. This approach mirrors its earlier preference for manageability over democratic choice but risks undermining popular will, reinforcing perceptions that India supports democracy only when outcomes favour its interests—a costly stance in politically awakened Bangladesh. Power in Dhaka is now moving away from New Delhi’s familiar hands. The incoming government, backed by popular vote, is expected to be more assertive and less deferential. In post-election Bangladesh, foreign policy alignment will be negotiated rather than assumed. India faces a choice: continue attempting to manage Dhaka from above or acknowledge that legitimacy now rests with public consent. Until it adapts, India’s anxiety over Bangladesh’s elections is unlikely to subside. —The writer is Senior Research Associate at the Centre for Aerospace and Security Studies (CASS), Lahore. (baloch.ameerabdullah@gmail.com)