Gulf security in transition
2026-02-24 - 22:23
For over a decade, regional and Western strategists assumed that a shared apprehension of Iran would naturally unite Israel and the Gulf monarchies into a coherent security axis. That premise is now collapsing. As Israel’s resort to force expands geographically and intensifies in scale and as public sentiment across the Arab world hardens, the Gulf’s perception of Israel is undergoing a profound transformation. Increasingly, key capitals now view Israel not as a stabilizing partner, but as a central security risk, often comparable to, or even greater than, Iran itself. The result is a regional security order that is more fragmented, multi‐aligned and crisis‐prone than Washington ever anticipated. The Abraham Accords were founded on a deceptively simple logic: shared hostility toward Iran could anchor a new Gulf‐Israeli security compact under American sponsorship. Normalization was marketed as more than trade or tourism, it was meant to become a cornerstone of a new regional architecture. But that logic has been steadily undermined. Israel’s sweeping military campaigns in Gaza, recurring strikes in Lebanon and Syria and now its operations edging into the Gulf’s periphery have triggered growing anxiety in Gulf capitals. The perception that Israel’s aggressive posture may draw them into unwanted conflict has gained traction, while Arab public opinion has turned sharply against normalization. What is surfacing is a delicate policy of “dual containment”: Gulf States are hedging against Iran’s proxies and missile capabilities while simultaneously insulating themselves from Israel’s adventurism and from Washington’s uncritical indulgence of it. This recalibration is visible in policy. Gulf countries are broadening their strategic portfolios instead of anchoring themselves in a rigid anti‐Iran bloc. Engagements with China and Russia now extend beyond trade to technology, energy and even arms deals, providing alternative sources of leverage and diplomatic cover. Diplomatic normalization with former rivals, most notably Iran and Syria, reflects a drive to prevent any single crisis from polarizing the region into opposing camps. Maritime security collaborations and energy coordination frameworks are reducing reliance on a US–Israeli security umbrella. Ties with Israel are not vanishing, but they are narrowing. Intelligence, cyber and missile defence cooperation continues discreetly; however, highly visible military exercises or overt political alignment have become domestically unsustainable. Within the GCC, divergence is widening—while the UAE and Bahrain still seek to preserve the functional dividends of normalization, Qatar, Kuwait and Oman are maintaining strategic distance. The net effect is a more transactional, flexible alliance system with less predictable loyalty to the West. The unraveling of the so‐called Abraham Alliance marks a significant strategic shift. The earlier vision of an integrated Arab‐Israeli defence network designed to counter Iran now appears politically untenable. Once Israel is perceived as a principal source of volatility, embedding it at the heart of regional security planning becomes impractical. In its place, Gulf States are cultivating more adaptive, overlapping security arrangements—sub‐regional maritime pacts, energy cooperation, de‐escalation mechanisms with Tehran and diversified defence procurement. This has elevated the strategic agency of regional middle powers such as Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the UAE. Each now acts as a diplomatic broker and economic heavyweight, maintaining open channels with rival global actors—Washington and Beijing, Tehran and Tel Aviv alike, to maximize autonomy and safeguard domestic priorities. Israel’s escalating military conduct is also eroding America’s credibility as a regional stabilizer. Washington’s inability or unwillingness to restrain Israeli actions that impinge on Gulf security has deepened doubts about its impartiality as a guarantor. Gulf States are not abandoning their defence ties with the US, but they are quietly diversifying security dependencies and asserting greater conditions for cooperation. These adjustments, however, introduce new volatility. The interaction of Israeli unilateralism, Iranian assertiveness and Gulf hedging generates complex crisis chains where no actor possesses decisive leverage. Domestic politics magnify the risk: Arab publics, galvanized by images from Gaza, see Israel as an aggressor, constraining their governments’ room for direct cooperation. For unelected monarchies, aligning too closely with Israel now carries tangible political costs. Looking forward, three trajectories seem probable if current trends persist. Gulf and wider Arab states are likely to employ diplomatic and procedural mean, limiting access, tightening conditions for intelligence cooperation or leveraging multilateral forums, to contain Israel’s freedom of action. Arab-led dialogue platforms and joint security mechanisms, sometimes involving Iran, often excluding both Iran and Israel, are likely to gain momentum. This diffusion of authority weakens Washington and Tel Aviv’s ability to dictate regional outcomes. Conditional normalization: Any future Arab-Israeli normalization, especially by Saudi Arabia, will likely hinge on tangible progress on the Palestinian issue and explicit guarantees against the use of Gulf territory for unilateral Israeli strikes. The reframing of Israel from linchpin of regional security to a potential source of instability signals a deeper structural shift. The Middle East appears headed toward a looser, multipolar environment defined by hedging, selective cooperation and adaptive alignments rather than fixed blocs. Gulf monarchies, prioritizing regime security and strategic autonomy, are crafting a cautious middle path between confrontation and entanglement. In this emerging order, Israel’s claim to be a pillar of regional stability is increasingly contested and American primacy, long taken for granted, now stands on shakier ground than at any point in recent memory. —The writer is former Ambassador, based in Islamabad. (naghmanahashmi40@gmail.com)