Militancy and security in Balochistan

2026-02-23 - 01:13

BALoCHISTAN is in the line of fire once again malignant tumor of obscurantist militancy is back with a vengeance and the province is in the grip of diehard militants on a campaign of terror and destruction. Militancy in Pakistan’s Baluchistan province is experiencing a major resurgence, marked by increased frequency and complexity of attacks by separatist groups targeting security forces and the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). Driven by grievances over economic deprivation, resource exploitation, and alleged state repression, this, alongside political instability, has significantly escalated violence since 2021. Since the start of the year 2025 there has been a very sharp increase in brutal and ruthless attacks by insurgents of the Baluch Liberation Army BLA, DAESH and some affiliated groups hell bent on causing havoc in the province. All attacks are a hall mark of sophistication such as the Jaffer Express hijacking by the BLA on 11th March 2025 that resulted in the kidnapping of over 400 passengers and the death of 26 hostages. Militant groups like the BLA and BLF very actively make use of suicide bombers including female bombers, seize territories, and target Chinese nationals and projects under CPEC. In response to real or imagined resentments the Baluch militant factions have launched many operations that have increasingly targeted Chinese nationals and Chinese Projects in the province. The BLA-J has spearheaded the anti-China campaign with a of deadly bombings and attacks and most of these attacks have been on Chinese nationals and interests, The BLA has repeated its threats against China and even issued a 90 days ultimatum to Beijing to withdraw its presence from Baluchistan, otherwise the group will increase its military activities against Chinese nationals and Pakistani security establishment. The BLA-J has carried out many independent operations against Chinese interests such as on June 29, 2020 suicide attack by four members of the Majeed Brigade who attacked the Pakistan Stock Exchange in Karachi and in April 2022 the BLA-J used its first ever female suicide bomber, Shaari Baloch who targeted the Confucius institute in Karachi. In October 2024 another suicide bomber of the BLA-J attacked a convoy of Chinese nationals and their security escort in Karachi. Other key Baloch groups—BLF, BLA-A, BRG, SRA—have carried out low-intensity attacks mostly targeting CPEC machinery, gas pipelines, mineral trucks, and workers involved in the project. Pakistan has sought China’s support in intelligence-sharing and counterinsurgency efforts, deepening Beijing’s involvement in its internal security. This cooperation in the security sector risks increasing Pakistan’s strategic dependency on China, granting Beijing influence over Pakistan’s security policies and decision-making process within certain matters relating to CPEC Since 2024, following Baloch militant groups’ attacks targeting Chinese interests and nationals, Pakistan-China security cooperations has been taking new steps, with a more robust Chinese participation in the security sphere of the CPEC project, specifically during the development of CPEC Phase II. Currently, several Chinese nationals are engaged in work at the Thar Coal Block power projects in Sindh under CPEC Amidst the rumors of possible deployment of Chinese forces in Pakistan—that Islamabad has vehemently denied—in the innermost security perimeter surrounding these workers could spark domestic backlash, as China’s expanding role may be perceived as infringing on Pakistan’s sovereignty. Insurgents may exploit this narrative, intensifying anti-China and anti-government sentiments. Another specific trend is the Baloch insurgents’ history of launching several operations during elections in Pakistan. Baloch insurgent groups consider parliamentary elections a tool of repression. As a result, insurgents have often targeted the election process since 2013. The tactics employed by the Baloch insurgents included targeting poll stations, election candidates, and threatening election staff in the province. Particularly, since its inception in 2017, BRAS has been the main coordinator of anti-election violence staged by its factions. Repeatedly, the umbrella organization has issued various statements arguing that the coalition rejected elections in Baluchistan and intended to boycott them by any means. In the last general election of the province in 2024, the insurgents remained a significant challenge for the election process, as evidenced by their number of attacks in parts of Baluchistan. The insurgents used light weapons and firecracker blasts to maintain fear among the participants, targeted killings, missiles, remote control bombs, and hand grenades. Between January and February 2024, BLA-A launched a special operation aimed at disrupting Pakistan’s political elections in Baluchistan, claiming 70 attacks targeting polling stations, convoys, political candidates, and security installations. As a result, BLA-A remained a prime reason for the postponement of the election process twice in its stronghold in Kohlu. The operation was launched in response to BRAS’ similar campaign in the same period that claimed 161 attacks carried out by the different factions belonging to the umbrella coalition in 22 areas of Baluchistan and Punjab province. —The writer is Professor of History, based in Islamabad.