Operation Ghazab Lil Haq — ‘Fury for the Sake of Justice’: Pakistan’s Strategic Dilemma in Afghanistan

2026-03-04 - 22:14

Pakistan and Afghanistan are in the midst of their most significant conflict since 2021, when the Taliban formally took over Kabul, marked by the launch of the operation “Ghazab Lil Haq,” meaning “Fury for the Sake of Justice.” The vulnerabilities that emerged have now escalated into open war between the two neighbors. From “Good Taliban, Bad Taliban” to “Afghan Taliban are friends,” the narrative has shifted to the reality that the TTP and Afghan Taliban are two faces of the same coin. It is now beyond doubt that Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) is supported and provided safe haven by the illegitimate Taliban government. In the past, the Taliban regime was not only recognized by Pakistan but was also supported. What went wrong, and where? More importantly, when and how did India get into the equation? May one dare speak of the role of America in creating them, fighting them, bombing them, and then empowering them once again through a calendar-based rather than conditions-based withdrawal. The U.S. left behind over $7 billion worth of military equipment, including a massive arsenal of weaponry, during its 2021 withdrawal from Afghanistan. This includes an estimated 358,530 assault rifles, 64,363 machine guns, 126,295 pistols, 22,174 Humvees, and nearly 200 artillery units. The Taliban also took control of approximately 1 million pieces of equipment and ammunition, including Black Hawk helicopters. The latest escalation is significant. Pakistan has now expanded its targeting beyond the TTP to the Taliban regime itself. Islamabad’s response included extensive airstrikes and artillery targeting major urban areas, including Kabul and Kandahar, where Taliban Supreme Leader Haibatullah Akhundzada is based. Another symbolic moment in this escalation was Pakistan’s strike on Bagram Air Base on 1st March 2026. Satellite imagery showed flattened warehouses at the base, once the nerve center of America’s 20-year war in Afghanistan and a prized strategic asset for the Taliban since 2021. Reportedly, the latest intel emerging is that the supplies and hardware destroyed also included some of Israeli origin. These attacks come after several rounds of intelligence-based operations inside Afghanistan, ceasefire talks, and constant back-and-forth engagement with no real progress. The escalation is the worst so far, as a fragile ceasefire has completely fractured. Relations are at their lowest ebb. Islamabad squarely holds Kabul responsible for increasing violent uprisings in its border regions. Pakistan has credible evidence that India supports TTP via Afghanistan, both logistically and monetarily, something it has been flagging for years now to the United Nations and other international forums. More sinister intel is emerging of an India-Israel-Afghanistan nexus working against Pakistan and Iran through Afghanistan. The Taliban are now seen by many in Pakistan as a proxy of India — an unlikely convergence between Islamist groups and New Delhi, including a warm reception for Taliban representatives in Delhi. For nearly two decades, Pakistan has suffered constant attacks from terrorists belonging to TTP. Islamabad blames the Taliban regime in Afghanistan for harboring these militants. India’s political and economic engagement with the Taliban comes at a time of surging cross-border violence between Pakistan and Afghanistan. The year 2025 was Pakistan’s deadliest in over a decade, marked by a sharp surge in militant violence. According to the South Asian Terrorism Portal, at least 1,070 violent incidents, including bomb blasts and armed assaults, were recorded last year, resulting in nearly 4,000 deaths across the country. These figures are not abstract statistics; they form the core of Islamabad’s security calculus. For Pakistan, the issue is no longer rhetorical but existential. The steady rise in cross-border attacks has directly shaped Islamabad’s decision to expand its response beyond defensive posturing. “Pakistan has only one ask that Afghan soil should not be used against Pakistan. This is the only issue we have. As long as it is settled, we have no other issue with Afghanistan,” said Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar. Thus, for Pakistan, the current escalation is not a choice but a response a signal that strategic patience has limits when internal security costs continue to rise. International calls for mediation are growing; however, the escalation involving Iran, the United States, Israel, and the Gulf states has overshadowed them. It may be overshadowed, but it also complicates the regional conflict matrix. Iran, Jordan, the UAE, China, Russia, and UN Secretary-General António Guterres have urged de-escalation and mediation. Yet most are preoccupied with the unfolding Gulf crisis involving Iran. Pakistan has drawn its red lines categorically this time. “There won’t be any talks. There is no dialogue. There is no negotiation. Terrorism from Afghanistan has to end,” said Musharraf Zaidi, spokesperson for foreign media for Shahbaz Sharif. Tit-for-tat attacks continue near the Torkham border. Taliban forces have reportedly attacked six Pakistani districts, including military camps in the border areas of Miranshah and Spinwam. A mosque attack in the city of Bannu injured and killed worshippers. Both sides claim to have inflicted losses on the other. The escalation trap can be self-defeating. No one can deny or challenge Pakistan’s military superiority; it is nuclear-armed and conventionally far superior. At the same time, the Taliban are adept at long warfare, hardened by decades of fighting US-led forces and, before that, the Soviet Union. The conflict matrix has become extremely complicated because of the large number of Afghanis still residing on Pakistani soil, despite the fact that as of May 2025, more than 280,000 Afghans have been deported or pressured to leave Pakistan. Since 2022, India has actively cultivated engagement with the Taliban government. Technical experts were sent to run Indian missions in Kabul, and New Delhi reopened its embassy. India also permitted Taliban-appointed diplomats to operate Afghanistan’s consulates in Mumbai and Hyderabad. Over the past two years, officials from New Delhi and Kabul have held meetings in Kabul, New Delhi, and Dubai. For Pakistan, this is not benign diplomacy at a time when Pakistan is battling rising militancy along its western border, India’s growing proximity to the Taliban regime creates a new layer of strategic pressure. India has consistently criticized Pakistan over the recent exchanges of fire between the two countries. India’s Foreign Ministry spokesperson Randhir Jaiswal said that India “strongly” condemns Pakistan’s air strikes, noting that they took place during the holy month of Ramadan. For India, Afghanistan offers a cost-effective strategic lever against Pakistan influence without overt confrontation. For Pakistan, it represents the opening of a second front in an already complex security environment. Pakistan needs a multi-pronged strategy to counter this challenge. The use of hard force is only one option; it may create deterrence temporarily but will not resolve the issue. Pakistan should push for a regime change in Afghanistan, which is more representative of its people and cultivates all factions within Afghanistan. Moreover, the atrocities committed by the Afghan Taliban on its people, especially women, cannot be supported. Also, Pakistan should engage the international community to highlight India’s alleged role and push for scrutiny through mechanisms such as FATF. Last but not least, now that a red line has been drawn, Pakistan should pursue tangible measures on the ground alongside calibrated third-party engagement. Force alone will not resolve the issue. We need a post-military-subjugation strategy for Afghanistan. Hard force should remain on the table; however, space for dialogue and diplomacy should also be created.