Pakistan and the US-Iran brinkmanship

2026-02-06 - 22:36

SOUTH Asia is an unforgiving strategic chessboard, where a single misstep can reverberate across borders and reshape the regional balance of power. Today, the drumbeats of confrontation between Washington and Tehran are louder than they have been in years. The United States has adopted a more openly coercive posture, marked by an expanded naval presence in the Persian Gulf and repeated assertions that “all options are on the table” regarding Iran’s nuclear program and internal stability. While much of the world treats this exchange as familiar rhetoric, its consequences would be anything but distant for Pakistan. For Islamabad, this is not simply another episode of great-power rivalry. Pakistan’s geography does not allow the luxury of detachment. Sharing a nearly 900-kilometre border with Iran, it would be among the first countries to feel the shockwaves of any military escalation—whether through security pressures, economic disruption or humanitarian fallout. The current phase of US–Iran tensions appears to be moving beyond the framework of “maximum pressure.” Recent statements from Washington suggest a shift away from containment toward open confrontation. History offers little reassurance. Even limited strikes could unravel an already fragile regional equilibrium. For Pakistan, the risks are immediate: a potential influx of refugees, heightened cross-border militancy and yet another setback to the long-delayed Iran–Pakistan gas pipeline, an energy project successive governments have described as strategically essential. Pakistan has lived through such spillovers before. After 2001, the war in Afghanistan quickly spilled into our own cities and border regions. Refugee flows, militant realignments and economic stress did not stop at international borders then and they would not stop in the event of a breakdown in Iran. The wider regional picture only sharpens these anxieties. West Asia has become a crowded and uneasy arena where the interests of China, India and a fragile Afghanistan increasingly collide. For Beijing, Iran is not just another partner; it is a key link in the Belt and Road Initiative. Tehran and Beijing have signed a 25-year cooperation accord, signaling a strategic partnership that covers energy and infrastructure. Any military escalation involving Iran would therefore ripple outward, affecting China’s energy security. For Pakistan, whose own economic trajectory is closely tied to CPEC, even modest instability along this axis would undermine hopes of sustained economic recovery. India, meanwhile, finds itself in an increasingly uncomfortable position. New Delhi has invested for years in its relationship with Tehran, especially in the development of the Chabahar Port, thus providing access to Central Asia while bypassing Pakistan. Any attack on Iran by the USA risks alienating Iran from India; stepping back invites further pressure from Washington. Afghanistan remains the most fragile piece on this regional chessboard. The Taliban-led Administration is grappling with economic collapse, internal divisions and growing isolation. A conflict involving Iran would almost certainly deepen Afghanistan’s instability, creating space for renewed proxy activity. Pakistan’s western provinces—particularly Baluchistan and the KP—would be among the first to feel the consequences. The human cost of such scenarios must not be underestimated. The language of “all options” has been used before—in Iraq, Libya and Syria. In none of these cases did it deliver stability or peace. Instead, it produced displacement, radicalization and fractured societies. Pakistan, which continues to host millions of Afghan refugees decades later, cannot afford another humanitarian crisis on its western flank. For ordinary Pakistanis, another regional war would not be an abstract debate; it would mean higher fuel prices, fewer jobs and greater insecurity. In this environment, Pakistan cannot remain a passive observer, nor can it afford to become a camp follower of any external power. What is required is steady, interest-driven diplomacy. First, Pakistan should pursue a proactive policy of neutrality. As during the Yemen conflict, Islamabad maintains principled distance while remaining diplomatically engaged. Its increasingly good relations with both Washington and Tehran position Pakistan to quietly support de-escalation. Past successes of back-channel diplomacy suggest dialogue remains possible if regional actors choose restraint. Second, Islamabad should work toward broader regional coordination. Forums such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization offer space to engage China, Russia and other stakeholders, while also reaching out to countries like Turkiye. A collective regional stance against unilateral military action would carry greater weight than isolated appeals. Third, internal preparedness remains essential. Border management and intelligence coordination must be strengthened to prevent militant spillover. At the same time, long-standing grievances in Baluchistan require attention through development and political inclusion, particularly during periods of regional uncertainty. Finally, energy diversification must move from promise to practice. While the Iran–Pakistan gas pipeline remains a sovereign commitment, the volatility of the Gulf underscores the need to accelerate renewable energy projects and secure diversified LNG arrangements. Overdependence on any single corridor leaves the economy exposed to shocks beyond its control. On an unforgiving chessboard, survival depends not on bold gestures but on careful moves. For Pakistan, restraint, foresight and diplomacy are not choices—they are necessities. —The writer is a freelance columnist based in Manchester, UK (umardar27@hotmail.com)