SMOKERS’ CORNER: THE MYTH OF UNITY

2026-03-21 - 04:10

Some political analysts have been suggesting that a formal rapprochement between the military establishment, the government and the incarcerated Pakistan Tehreek-i-Insaf (PTI) leader Imran Khan is the only viable path forward, as Pakistan enters a tricky situation that demands political unity. They argue that, as Pakistan faces a predicament demanding national cohesion, particularly amidst an open war on the Afghan border, the spillover of the recent conflict in the Gulf and a constant threat from India, the call for unity must override internal grievances. By advocating for a negotiated settlement between the PTI and the government/state, these voices claim a united front is essential to signal strength to the world. While this narrative sounds like common sense, a closer look at the political reality of 2026 reveals that pursuing unity through granting concessions to a political personality may be a rather naive idea. The gap between the PTI and the state has increasingly become an unbridgeable chasm. Since the events of May 9, 2023, when the PTI set out to allegedly trigger a coup within the military, the party’s rhetoric has rapidly shifted from conventional political opposition to an almost existential challenge against the state’s institutions. At least, this is the conviction held by the government and the military establishment. While some argue that unity is essential as Pakistan faces mounting security threats, history and the country’s current political trajectory suggest that concessions to a populist leader may deepen, rather than resolve, Pakistan’s structural instability Even as the country faces a looming threat from India and a surge in terror attacks by Islamist militants and Baloch separatists, the PTI leadership continues to frame the current administration as ‘mandate thieves’ and views the military leadership as personal adversaries. In such a volatile climate, the idea of dialogue is not viewed by the state as a tool for stability, but rather as a tactical pause used by a problematic actor to regain leverage. In the eyes of the military establishment, offering concessions to the PTI would signal that the state’s legal and moral authority is vulnerable whenever a serious militant or military threat appears. One can safely claim that the thinking in the government and the military establishment is that concessions will create a precedent of political actors being incentivised to manufacture or exploit national instability to secure personal legal relief. In December last year, a politician currently in the administration told me that if the government yields to a populist leader under the pressure of a national security crisis, “it validates a form of veto politics that undermines the very concept of a sovereign state.” It tells every future political player that the way to negotiate with the state is not through parliament, but by creating enough internal friction that would leave the state with no other choice but to buy their cooperation during a crisis. History provides sobering lessons on the dangers of such internal appeasement. As noted in history professor Eric D. Weitz’s Weimar Germany: Promise and Tragedy, the decline of the Weimar Republic (1918-1933) was accelerated by constant attempts to tame radical populist elements through backroom political deals and multiple political and legal concessions. These manoeuvres only served to weaken the state’s institutions, eventually leading to a systemic collapse, because the state had bargained away its monopoly on authority in a desperate bid for short-term stability. A lesson can also be drawn from the American Civil War (1861-1865). According to historian James McPherson, US President Abraham Lincoln faced immense pressure from the opposition, and sometimes from within his own party, to initiate an immediate dialogue and provide concessions to the separatist states to end the bloodshed. Lincoln famously refused to compromise the legal integrity of the union for an “empty peace.” His response was rooted in the understanding that a state that negotiates its principles under duress ceases to be a state at all. Unfortunately, PTI has shown little interest in institutional responsibility, preferring the role of the perpetual outsider that critiques from the sidelines without offering a viable, collaborative path forward. The 27th Amendment in the Constitution, enacted by Pakistan’s parliament in 2025, has reconfigured the Pakistani state, centralising military command under the ‘Chief of Defence Forces’ and establishing a federal constitutional court. Indeed, this is a hardline shift, specifically designed to insulate the state from the vulnerable position that it has often found itself in when it was willing to bargain and buy cooperation from opponents. The proponents of a dialogue have to keep this in mind and shape a narrative accordingly. For the military to return to its role as a political broker at this stage would undo the institutional cohesion it has spent the last year trying to enforce. One cannot build a new order on the foundation of old compromises. The 27th Amendment is a push towards creating this new order. British historian Alistair Horne notes in his book A Savage War of Peace that the French Fourth Republic (1946-58) was plagued by constant ‘dialogue’ and fluid political coalitions that left the state powerless to handle various internal and external crises. It was only when the former French president Charles de Gaulle established a new, institutionally rigid constitutional framework that France found the stability to effectively address its challenges. For the current government and military establishment in Pakistan, reverting to informal deals would be a regression to the ‘instability’ that the 27th Amendment seeks to address, even though opponents of the amendment insist the state itself is to blame for this instability by keeping the PTI out of power. However, pragmatism and realism suggest that national unity in 2026 should mean the public standing behind the state, government and the Constitution, rather than a specific political personality. The idea that Pakistan’s defence against India, Islamist militants and Baloch separatists hinges on the satisfaction of one jailed leader is viewed by the military establishment as a slight to the capability of its forces. Unity is forged in the fire of shared sacrifice and struggle. In my view, those calling for a dialogue today are asking for a shortcut that leads back to the same cycle of instability the country has suffered for decades. In a time of crisis, the only dialogue that matters is the one conducted through the formal channels of the Constitution. Perhaps that is why those opposing the current administration have stopped being fans of the Constitution as it stands after the 27th Amendment. But it is now a reality that they will have to work with. Those demanding a dialogue with Khan from outside the PTI may merely be ticking a box for public consumption. They know quite well that hinging national unity during a crisis on a dialogue with a single political personality is a fanciful idea. This is especially true for a military establishment that has seen its global currency rise after the war against India in May last year and the ongoing operations against Islamist militants inside Afghanistan. Published in Dawn, EOS, March 29th, 2026