Strengthening Export Control Act 2004

2026-02-02 - 23:06

THE prevention of Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) terrorism requires effective implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 (UNSCR 1540). The significance of resolution has been increasing due to transnational terrorist groups’ access to emerging disruptive technologies and global reach. Therefore, implementing the Resolution not only enhances national security but also has a constructive impact on international security. Therefore, it is the responsibility of all members of the United Nations to implement UNSCR 1540 in letter and spirit. The United Nations Security Council in its 4956th meeting on April 28, 2004, adopted a non-proliferation resolution by which it decided that all states should refrain from supporting by any means non-state actors that attempt to acquire, use or transfer nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and their delivery systems. The Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 1540 (2004) under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. The Council also decided that all states would establish domestic controls to prevent the proliferation of such weapons and means of delivery, particularly for terrorist purposes, including by establishing appropriate rules governing related materials and adopting legislative measures in that respect. Indeed, it was an important initiative to act collectively to deny non-state actors’ access to chemical, biological, nuclear and radiological materials. The Resolution made all the members of the United Nations stakeholders and made obligations for them to legislate and execute laws to safeguard their chemical, biological and nuclear facilities and material from terrorists. Therefore, the states, including Pakistan, have implemented a wide range of domestic legislation to prevent such proliferation. The rapid transformation in CBRN technology requires United Nations members to continuously update their domestic laws to maintain the effectiveness of UNSCR 1540. The government of Pakistan is cognizant of the challenges posed by CBRN terrorism. The Pakistan Export Control on Goods, Technologies, Materials and Equipment Related to Nuclear and Biological Weapons and their Delivery Systems Act, 2004, demonstrates its commitment to implementing Resolution 1540. Islamabad frequently reviews and revamps its export control regime to strengthen its control over the sensitive and dual-use technologies of nuclear, biological and missile-related applications. It reaffirms the country’s commitment to act as a responsible technology-holding state, firmly committed to non-proliferation objectives and the fulfilment of its international obligations. Once again last year, Pakistan revised the National Control Lists under the Export Control Act, 2004, to facilitate exports in accordance with the norms and rules governing the non-proliferation of nuclear and biological technologies and materials. The Foreign Ministry notified on October 13, 2025, that amendments to the Control Lists were published in the Gazette of Pakistan through S.R.O. 1977(I)/2025. It stated, “In exercise of the powers under the Export Control on Goods, Technologies, Material and Equipment related to Nuclear and Biological Weapons and their Delivery Systems Act, 2004 (SECA-2004), the Government of Pakistan has notified the updated National Control Lists of items requiring an export licence from the Strategic Export Control Division (SECDIV), Ministry of Foreign Affairs.” Pakistan is a party to the Chemical Weapons Conventions and proclaims to adhere to its norms and rules in letter and spirit. Notably, chemical and biological security require greater rigor. For instance, one of my PhD students conducted research on Pakistan’s chemical industry. He identified various grey areas in the safety and security of the chemical industry. These grey areas alarm us about the inadvertent release of chemical materials into the hands of non-state actors. These grey areas cannot be clarified without the proper legislation. Therefore, the government should revisit its chemical industry regulations and revise them. Biosecurity remains an untapped area in both developed and less-developed states. Admittedly, the Anthrax attacks in September 2001 had shaken the United States ruling elite and civil society, but failed to attract the attention of the governments and civil societies in the developing states. The encouraging development is that the biologists did an impressive job in biosafety, but biosecurity securitization has received little attention from social scientists. Consequently, policymakers and civil society, especially in developing states, seem apathetic towards biosecurity. To mitigate biological threats, policymakers and civil society in the country must work together to securitize Biosecurity. Periodic revisions to the Export Control Act of 2004 are a significant government practice in Pakistan. To prevent chemical, biological, nuclear and radiological threats, additional work in civil society is required. For instance, UNSCR 1540 and the Export Control Act 2004 would be included in the syllabi of relevant disciplines—biology, chemistry, physics, international relations, political science, strategic studies, etc.—at all levels of education. For instance, at the school level, an elementary form of the Resolution’s objectives could be taught. The proper Resolution’s application format is taught and practical experiments ought to be included in the College and University curriculums. The continuous awareness programmes also introduced various activities/events at the Campuses, such as conferences, workshops and seminars, in which experts, both academics and practitioners, participate. The encouraging news is that at the School of Politics and International Relations, Quaid-i-Azam University, CBRN terrorism, countermeasures, UNSCR 1540 and the Export Control Act 2004 are included in the arms control, disarmament and international security curriculum at the Bachelor’s, MPhil and PhD levels. A similar approach shall be encouraged in other academic institutions. —The writer is Prof at the School of Politics and IR, Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad. (jaspal_99@hotmail.com)